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Abstract 
It is increasingly apparent that, despite earlier hopes, the global economic crisis will 
have a significant impact on the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa. In order to co-
ordinate and craft the most appropriate responses for African economies to withstand 
and recover from the crisis, it is necessary to identify the degree to which the continent, 
as well as the individual African countries, is at risk of being negatively impacted. This 
depends on both vulnerability to trade and financial shocks, as well as the resilience of 
countries to cope with these shocks. Accordingly, vulnerability and resilience indices are 
constructed for the continent and individual countries. It is shown that, of all developing 
regions, Africa is the most at risk from the crisis: it has higher vulnerability to trade and 
financial shocks, and it has the least resilience of all regions. Based upon a vulnerability-
resilience matrix, the African countries most at risk are the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Burundi, Côte D’Ivoire, Liberia, Angola, the Sudan, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, 
Zimbabwe, Somalia, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Ghana, Cape Verde and Mauritania. With a 
few notable exceptions, such as Kenya and Ghana, these are all ‘fragile states’. Based 
upon the distinction between vulnerability and resilience, an action guide is proposed. 
This makes a distinction between short-term and longer-term actions, in particular be-
tween actions aimed at mitigating the impact of the external shocks, assisting countries 
to cope, and actions aimed at reducing risk. 
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1 Introduction 
The current global economic crisis, which has been forecasted to see world GDP decline 
by 1.3 per cent in 20091, has come as a substantial and largely unexpected external 
shock to the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, the world’s poorest continent. As a group 
of countries that are particularly dependent on foreign financial inflows and even more 
dependent on commodity-based export-led growth, they are now confronted by two si-
multaneous external shocks emanating from the advanced economies. The first is a 
negative shock to their financial flows due directly and indirectly to the financial crisis 
which erupted in October 2008 in the US and quickly spread to Europe and parts of Asia. 
The second is a negative shock to their exports, as demand and prices for Africa’s prod-
ucts dropped as the US and European economies went into recession in late 2008. 
These two simultaneous shocks pose a huge risk to African growth and development. 
They have hit precisely at the midpoint of the period towards the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) when various assessments have concluded that 
African countries are behind schedule. The real risk is now that progress will be further 
derailed. 
Although economic growth is not a perfect development indicator, there is a fair con-
sensus that economic growth is necessary for development. In the case of Africa, it has 
been estimated that an annual average growth rate of 7 per cent should be maintained 
in order to allow the continent to achieve at least MDG number one, which is to halve 
the number of people living on less than $ 1 per day. As a result of the shocks of finan-
cial and economic crisis, Africa’s growth rate for 2009 and 2010 has been revised sub-
stantially downwards by international financial institutions. For instance, as is shown in 
Appendix A, the IMF has revised Africa’s economic growth forecasts for 2009 down-
wards from 5 per cent in October 2008, to 3.5 per cent in January 2009 to 1.7 per cent 
in April 2009. And the World Bank has revised African growth prospects down to 2.4 per 
cent for 2009.2 
The consequences of such a reduction in growth in a region that is already home to 
the largest number of low-income countries in the world is likely to be higher unem-
ployment3 and greater poverty,4 increases in infant mortality, and adverse coping with 
long-lasting impacts, such as higher school drop-out rates, reductions in healthcare, en-
vironmental degradation and a rise in criminality and conflict. 
How substantial are the risks to Africa, and what can be done to help African coun-
tries withstand the crisis? 
These are the questions to which African countries, regional bodies, development or-
ganisations, the G-20 and the international community now need quick and practical an-
swers. 
In answering these questions, two aspects need to be kept in mind. 
First, much is at stake in preventing economic growth from collapsing in Africa. Even 
if growth can be re-started again relatively soon, the effects of a growth acceleration 
and growth collapse are asymmetric. According to Arbache and Page (2008:9): 
                                          
1  See the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, April 2009 (IMF, 2009a). Reviews and analyses of the 
causes of the crisis are contained in Morris (2008), Eichengreen et al., (2009), Taylor (2009) 
and others. A timeline of the financial crisis is provided by Guillén (2009). 
2  The African Development Bank (AfDB, 2009) also predicts GDP growth of 2.4 per cent for Sub-
Saharan Africa in 2009. 
3  The International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2009) predicts that up to 3 million additional peo-
ple could be left unemployed in 2009 in SSA as a result of the crisis, raising the total number of 
unemployed in SSA to 28 million. 
4  The ILO (2009) estimates that the number of working poor in SSA could increase by up to 36 
million between 2007 and 2009 as a result of the crisis. 
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“While growth accelerations result in relatively small improvements in human de-
velopment, decelerations have important negative impacts on education and 
health outcomes. Under 5 mortality and infant mortality, for example, are substan-
tially higher during growth decelerations than in normal times, but they do not im-
prove during growth accelerations.” 
The imperative of preventing or limiting growth collapses in Africa is therefore para-
mount if permanent or long-term scars on the continent’s development is to be limited. 
The second aspect to keep in mind in answering these questions is that, as the finan-
cial crisis comes hot on the heels of the fuel and food price crises, many African coun-
tries will have little means to stimulate domestic demand through expansionary mone-
tary and fiscal policies. External financial resources will be required. Many estimates are 
now forthcoming as to the amounts needed. While this is important, it should not be 
forgotten that, even if the financial resources for Africa can be found, many govern-
ments may not have the capacity or the willingness to spend these resources effectively 
and efficiently. Many African states, as has been remarked earlier, are low-income coun-
tries and fragile states. Such states face added vulnerabilities during the downturn and 
have less resilience to recover. Here, different responses may be required to prevent the 
crisis from pushing some of them into failed states. 
This paper attempts to address these questions by assessing the risk to Africa from 
the perspective of the recent literature on vulnerability to hazards (see, for example, 
Naudé, Santos-Paulino and McGillivray, 2008; 2009). Herein, the extent to which a 
country, region or household is at risk from an external shock or hazard will depend on 
its exposure to that risk, its vulnerability and its resilience. From this perspective, with-
standing a hazard such as the global economic crisis requires measures to reduce risk, 
to mitigate the impacts of the hazard, and to strengthen the ability of the affected coun-
tries to cope. Thus, this paper will first (in Section 2) define and discuss the concepts of 
risk, vulnerability and coping, and their measurement. Thereafter (in Section 3), it will 
analyse Africa’s exposure and vulnerability towards the two external shocks. Then (in 
Section 4), it will consider how resilient African countries are. 
Section 5 aims to bring the analyses of the previous sections down to the country 
level, and offers a categorisation of individual African countries into countries at high, 
medium and low risks. Such a categorisation may be useful when considering the type of 
support and the prioritisation of support measures to African countries. Thus, the cate-
gorisation is kept in mind in Section 6, which deals with responses towards weathering 
the crisis. These focus on risk reduction, risk mitigation and risk coping, and identify 
measures which African countries and the international community can take in each of 
these. 
Finally, Section 7 contains some concluding remarks. It provides a reminder that Afri-
can countries already faced severe development challenges before the current crisis. 
When the short-term imperative of managing the crisis is past, African countries and the 
international community will have to pick up the development agenda where it left off, 
and factor in the longer-term structural changes in the global economy and in develop-
ment-thinking which the crisis may bring about. The short-term actions of the interna-
tional community and African governments should not detract from the long-term task 
of fixing Africa’s economies. 
2 Risk, Vulnerability and Coping 
The risk and extent of Africa being negatively affected by the global economic crisis de-
pends on its vulnerability towards external economic shocks as well as its resilience (or 
coping) in the face of such shocks. 
Vulnerability has been defined as the probability of a “system” undergoing a negative 
change due to a “perturbation” (Gallopin 2006: 294). This is a broad definition which 
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allows for systems to be countries, regions and households, whereas the tradition in mi-
cro-economics has been to define vulnerability at household level simply as the probabil-
ity that a household will fall into poverty or remain in poverty in a future period (see, for 
example, Chaudhuri et al., 2002; Günther and Harttgen 2006). Guillaumont (2008:5) 
defines vulnerability as “the risk that economic growth is markedly and extensively re-
duced by shocks”. 
Countries are economically vulnerable to the extent that they are exposed to external 
shocks (which is outside their direct control). Sources of external shocks can be natural 
events (which will not be considered here), as well as international trade and financial 
shocks. The extent of a country’s exposure to the latter will generally depend on its de-
pendency on exports and its degree of export diversification, and on its openness to fi-
nancial flows. More specifically, economic vulnerability has been measured in the eco-
nomic literature by a variety of measures related to a country’s foreign trade and in-
vestment profile. The most widely recognised measures of economic vulnerability include 
(see, for example, Briguglio et al., 2008; Guillaumont, 2008): 
• The openness of an economy as measured by the share of exports in GDP. 
Countries with a higher share of exports in GDP are seen as being more sus-
ceptible to adverse changes in external demand; 
• The degree of diversification of a country’s exports, as measured for in-
stance by a Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Countries whose exports are more di-
versified are seen as less vulnerable to external shocks, even if their absolute 
level of exports is high; 
• The external indebtedness of a country, as measured by external debt as a 
share of GDP. States with high debt burdens or liabilities most often do not 
have the resources to respond to the mitigation of poverty or the potential im-
pacts of external shocks.5 
These vulnerability measures, common, for instance, in standard economic vulner-
ability indices, such as the UN’s Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI), ignore the potential 
vulnerability stemming from a country’s financial openness or integration into the global 
financial system. In this particular crisis, an important feature has been the contagion 
effects through the banking sectors of developed countries. In this paper the economic 
vulnerability measures will, therefore, be complemented by financial/banking vulnerabil-
ity measures. In the context of Africa, for which detailed data on the banking sector may 
be hard to come by, the most readily available of such measures will include (following 
the IMF, 2009a): 
• The regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets of a country’s banking sys-
tem. The amount of capital kept by banks act as a buffer against losses. One of 
the features of the financial crisis in the US and the EU has been the extent to 
which banks have been highly leveraged, and have ended up with insufficient 
capital once they started to have non-performing assets on the balance sheets. 
Higher capital to (risk-weighted) asset ratios would be indicative of a lower 
vulnerability of a country’s banking sector. 
• The extent of a country’s banks cross-border liabilities to banks in advanced 
economies. This can be measured by the amount of liabilities of a country’s 
banking sector to banks in BIS (Bank for International Settlements) member 
countries. This is a good measurement of the international integration of a 
country’s banking sector, and thus of its concomitant vulnerability should banks 
in advanced economies suffer losses. 
                                          
5  The IMF and World Bank, since 1996, identify a category of states that are both poor and heav-
ily indebted – “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries” (HIPCs). Of 41 HIPCs in 2007, 80 per cent are 
in Africa. 
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• The extent of the growth of credit to the private sector. In countries where 
this had grown very rapidly in recent years, banks may be more exposed to 
non-performing loans – a more indirect impact of the financial crisis. In such 
instances, banks would need to be carefully supervised and monitored, as an 
increase in non-performing loans could create both liquidity- and solvency-
problems for banks. 
When an external shock does occur, the risk of it causing negative change, and the 
extent of that change, not only depends on the economic vulnerability of a country, but 
also depends on its resilience. Resilience refers to a country’s coping ability, i.e., its abil-
ity to recovery from a shock. According to Briguglio et al., (2008:2): 
“economic resilience is associated with actions undertaken by policy-makers and 
private economic agents which enable a country to withstand or recover from the 
negative effects of shocks. Actions which enable a country to better benefit from 
positive shocks are also considered to be conducive to economic resilience.” 
Guillaumont (2008) makes a distinction between structural economic vulnerability, 
which is exogenous to a developing country, such as the financial crisis in the US, and 
state fragility, which is vulnerability due to inappropriate policies, institutions and weak 
governance. This implies that, in order to deal with vulnerability, we would need to deal 
not only with the sources of vulnerability in the external environment, but also with 
“self-inflicted” vulnerabilities due to various degrees of state fragility. Indeed, in Africa, 
self-inflicted vulnerability may be a important factor which reduces resilience, as it is the 
continent with the largest number of formally identified “fragile states” in the world.6 
The most widely recognised measures of resilience include (see, for example, Brigug-
lio et al., 2008): 
• Proper macro-economic management, which will be reflected in balance of 
payments and fiscal balances, and levels of currency reserves. Countries which 
have and who can manage these well, will be more resilient in the face of the 
global economic crisis. Countries with large balance of payments and/or fiscal 
deficits will have more difficulty responding to external shocks, and low levels 
of foreign exchange reserves may cause countries to suffer sudden and debili-
tating changes in relative prices and access to imported goods. It is telling that, 
after the 1998 Asian crisis, many developing countries started purposely to ac-
cumulate greater foreign exchange reserves as insurance against future exter-
nal shocks. 
• Good governance. Governance refers to “the manner in which power is exer-
cised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for de-
velopment” (World Bank 1992, as quoted in Cannon, 2008:8). The World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) defines governance as: “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This in-
cludes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and re-
placed; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them.” (World Bank, 2009 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp). Good governance en-
                                          
6  A fragile state can be fined as a state that ‘cannot provide the basic functions of governance to 
its population (CIFP, 2006:3). The World Bank describes low-income countries “under stress” 
(LICUS) as “fragile states”. These are low-income countries with a score of 3.0 or less in terms 
of its Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings. SSA’s fragile states according 
to the World Bank are Central African Republic, Comoros, Liberia, Somalia and Zimbabwe (se-
vere fragile states), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte D’Ivoire, Eri-
trea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo (core fragile states) and Chad, the Gambia, 
São Tomé and Principe, Sierra Leone (marginal fragile states). 
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ables countries to respond in time and appropriate fashion to the global eco-
nomic crisis. 
• Market efficiency or the environment for doing business. With a conducive 
environment for doing business, “markets adjust rapidly to achieve equilibrium 
following an external shock, the risk of being negatively affected by such a 
shock will be lower than if market disequilibria tend to persist.” (Briguglio et 
al., 2008: 9). Countries in which it is easy to establish a new business may be 
more resilient that countries in which it is more difficult. 
• Social cohesion, which is often measured using ethno linguistic fractionalisa-
tion, income inequality or political instability. Strong social cohesion may make 
it easier and quicker for countries to adopt and see through tough, but neces-
sary, measures to manage the impacts of the global economic crisis. 
The concepts of vulnerability and resilience are often confused by policy-makers and 
academics. For instance, the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2009b) sees the vulner-
ability of African countries as being determined by macro-economic balances and pov-
erty. In the framework discussed here, however, it is clear that macro-economic imbal-
ances and poverty are not structural features which are outside the short-term control of 
governments. They are, indeed, the outcomes of the degree of resilience of an economy, 
whereas the underlying structural determinants of vulnerability resides in the openness 
and exposure of their economies to global markets. 
As a framework for exploring how African economies can withstand the financial and 
economic crisis, the approach discussed so far is summarised in Diagram 1. 
Diagram 1: A Vulnerability–Resilience Framework for Conceptualising the Im-
pact of the Financial and Economic Crisis on Africa 
Risk and Extent of 
Adverse Impact of 
Financial and 
Economic Crisis
Vulnerability  
to external economic 
shocks
Resilience 
(Coping Ability)
Inherent (Structural) 
determinants:
•Banking sector 
exposure
•Export dependence
•Export concentration
Nurtured determinants
•Macro‐economic 
management
•Good governance
•Ease of doing business
•Social cohesion
’Fragile’ and ’failed’ states
High Low
 
(Source: Adapted from Briguglio et al., 2008) 
Diagram 1 indicates that the risk and extent of an adverse impact of the global eco-
nomic crisis on African economies will depend on their vulnerability to external economic 
shocks (which depends, in turn, on structural aspects of their economies and their inte-
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gration into the world economy) as well as on their resilience (which can be nurtured, 
and depends on good economic management, good governance, ease of doing business 
and social cohesion). The diagram suggests that, in the case of fragile and failed states, 
this vulnerability will be high, while resilience will be low. 
The approach that will be taken in the remainder of this paper is to assess Africa’s 
vulnerability and resilience in the light of this framework. Little can be done over the 
short-term to address the vulnerability of African countries. However, by identifying the 
most vulnerable countries, and the countries in which resilience is low, priorities for as-
sistance and special support may be identified. These may address vulnerabilities di-
rectly (such as supporting African trade) or aim to strengthen resilience (such as by 
budgetary aid and easing constraints on the business sector). 
In terms of the remainder of this paper, it will be shown in Section 3 that Africa as a 
continent faces particularly high vulnerability, and, in Section 4, that the overall level of 
resilience is low. Then, in Section 5, individual countries are categorised. The purpose of 
such categorisation is to identify the African countries which are more likely to be worst 
affected by the crisis, and which ones will most be in need of external assistance. Then, 
the remainder of this paper identifies the types of support measures for countries with 
different vulnerability-resilience profiles. 
3 How Vulnerable is Africa? 
With reference to Diagram 1, the Table 1 compares Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with 
other regions in the world in terms of a selection of structural indicators of vulnerability 
towards external trade and financial shocks. 
It makes a broad distinction between financial and trade vulnerability, although, in 
practice, these are inter-related. Financial vulnerability here refers to the exposure of 
SSA to possible adverse shocks in the advanced economies’ banking sectors (for exam-
ple, contagion due to toxic assets) and in important sources of external finance, such as 
aid, remittances, FDI and portfolio equity flows. Trade vulnerability refers to the expo-
sure of SSA to possible adverse shocks to their export demand, export prices, and debt 
servicing capacity. 
3.1 Financial Vulnerability 
Table 1 partly confirms the view that the SSA’s financial institutions may be less imme-
diately affected by direct contagion from US and EU banks, due to their relatively-limited 
global integration. Thus, the Table indicates that, by 2006-7, the SSA’s liabilities to for-
eign banks were less than 1 per cent of GDP – compared, for instance, to 9 per cent in 
East Asia and the Pacific, and almost 5 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean.7 
According to the IMF (2009a: 27), African countries have, so far, avoided banking crises 
as elsewhere due to: 
“the still limited though increasing integration with global financial markets, mini-
mal exposure to complex financial instruments, relatively high bank liquidity, lim-
ited reliance on foreign funding, and low leverage in financial institutions.” 
But African financial institutions may not yet be out of the woods. Table 1 also sug-
gests that domestic credit to the private sector had significantly increased in the SSA in 
recent years, and now exceeds that of all developing regions except for East Asia and 
                                          
7  The countries of “emerging Europe”, were amongst the most significantly impacted upon by the 
financial meltdown affecting US and Western European banks. Hungary, Iceland and Ukraine 
were amongst the countries needing emergence assistance from the IMF by the end of 2008. 
At the time of the outbreak of the crisis, these countries’ liabilities towards US and European 
Banks exceeded 50 per cent of GDP (IMF, 2009a). 
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the Pacific. In addition, in about half the African countries, foreign ownership in the local 
banking sector is significant – with foreign banks owning more than 50 per cent of local 
banking assets. To the extent that African banks may start to face adverse develop-
ments in their balance sheets due to exposure to, and linkages, with foreign banks, that 
the impact is more likely to come from the more substantial linkages with Western Euro-
pean, rather than US banks – especially banks in the UK, Portugal and France. This 
could, however, also be a cloud with a silver-lining, given that Western European banks 
have been less affected than US banks. 
Table 1: Measures of Economic Vulnerability of SSA in comparison to other re-
gions (most recent date, of 2007 or 2006) 
  
Latin Amer-
ica and Car-
ibbean 
Middle East 
and North 
Africa  
East Asia 
and the 
Pacific 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Financial Vulnerability     
Liabilities to Advanced Economies' 
Banks (% of GDP) 4.69 1.70 9.15 0.92 
Portfolio equity flows (as % of GNI) 0.40 0.16 1.52 2.43 
Domestic credit to private sector (% 
of GDP) 36.62 42.13 97.55 70.38 
Stocks traded, total value (% of 
GDP) 24.28 18.82 191.23 60.90 
Aid (% of GNI) 0.19 1.83 0.20 4.45 
Remittances (% of GDP) 1.76 3.74 1.51 2.46 
Foreign direct investment, net in-
flows (% of GDP) 3.00 3.69 4.06 3.41 
Trade Vulnerability     
Exports of goods and services (% of 
GDP) 24.04 36.05 47.94 34.46 
Export concentration index* 0.15 0.46 0.11 0.40 
Fuel exports (% of merchandise ex-
ports) 13.87 75.42 7.32 39.35 
Fuel imports (% of merchandise im-
ports) 10.86 13.70 14.11 16.73 
External debt stocks (% of GNI) 23.74 18.94 17.02 24.85 
Short-term debt (% of total re-
serves) 31.06 8.92 15.54 31.41 
Total reserves (% of total external 
debt) 54.58 154.91 253.08 80.28 
Total reserves in months of imports 7.68 20.13 15.16 7.46 
(Note: * the export concentration index is from UNCTAD’s export concentration index, which is a normalized 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann index where 1 is maximum concentration) 
(Source: Author’s compilation from World Bank Development Indicators, IMF (2009a) and UNCTAD) 
Table 1 moreover indicates that, whereas the direct contagion impact on Africa’s 
banks may be less of an immediate danger than in other regions, its financial sector, 
more broadly, may be negatively impacted. 
Portfolio equity flows (short-term financial inflows) in SSA stood at over 2 per cent of 
GDP. Adverse movements in these flows will have a swift impact on stock markets, ex-
change rates, and, indirectly, will affect banks’ balance sheets. 
Africa’s stock markets have seen quite rapid development since the early 1990s, and, 
as Table 1 shows, by 2006, stocks traded on Africa’s markets reached over 60 per cent 
of GDP - a higher proportion than in Latin America or MENA.8 The potential impact of a 
sudden reversal in portfolio equity flows as a “flight to safety” response may, therefore, 
                                          
8  According to the IMF (2009b:16), Africa’s stock market capitalisation stood at US $ 1,182 bil-
lion in 2006, which was 107 per cent of Africa’s GDP – a percentage exceeding that of Latin 
America (63 per cent), the Middle East (82 per cent) and emerging Europe (73 per cent). 
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be particularly damaging, as, indeed, subsequent events have shown. By the end of 
2008, the South African stock market (the largest in Africa) had lost 25 per cent of its 
value, and, by the end of March 2009, the Nigerian stock market’s All Share Index had 
fallen by 37 per cent in one quarter – the largest such decline in the world.9 
Although the SSA’s relatively limited internationally integrated financial sector offers 
some protection against direct contagion effects, there is concern that the financial crisis 
will hurt African financial development over the longer term. As expressed by Maimbo 
(2008:1): 
“…the impact on the financial sector in Africa may actually be more significant and 
longer lasting than first assumed.” 
He discusses the impact of the crisis in weakening African stock markets, stifling in-
novation and less conservative lending practices, leading to significant losses in central 
banks’ reserve assets,10 in entrenching government ownership in the financial sector, 
and in weakening bank balance-sheets to the point at which bank failures could occur. 
In addition, many foreign (western) banks may reduce operations in Africa as a result 
of the crisis, with negative implications for the availability of credit and the financial in-
novation on the continent. 
Table 1, furthermore, shows that, as far as financial vulnerability is concerned, Africa 
is more dependent than any other region on aid (official development assistance) and 
the second most (after the MENA region) on remittances. Aid and remittances consti-
tuted more than 7 per cent of Africa’s GDP by 2006 – in terms of 2007 values, this is an 
amount of around $ 60 billion. 
Africa’s share of global FDI has historically been small (less than 2 per cent), but, in 
terms of Africa’s GDP, FDI had increased in importance in recent years, with especially 
resource-rich and oil-rich countries attracting the bulk of Africa’s FDI. By 2007, FDI 
amounted to about 3.5 per cent of Africa’s GDP. The value of FDI is not only in its finan-
cial contribution, but also in bringing access to technology, know-how and international 
markets. 
Taken together, FDI, aid, remittances and portfolio outflows, the amount of financial 
resources at risk to Africa may amount to around 12–15 per cent of Africa’s GDP. 
Clearly, it is unlikely that any of these, will be reduced to zero, but even if the extent of 
the reduction is only limited to a 30–40 per cent drop, it may still amount to a $50-60 
billion annual decline in financial resources. 
How likely is it that declines of such magnitudes will be realised? This will depend on 
the depth and duration of the crisis in the advanced economies. However, a number of 
predictions have been made of the likely reductions in financial flows to African coun-
tries. 
3.2 Trade vulnerability 
While undoubtedly vulnerable towards declines in external financial resources, and with 
estimates of these declines ranging between $20 and 50 billion per annum, the most 
significant impact of the financial and economic crisis on Africa will be through the loss in 
Africa’s exports. 
                                          
9  See ‘Nigeria Becomes World’s Worst Market on Bank Losses’ at:  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&refer=world_indices&sid=aHYaT8.nfkg0
#. 
10  As discussed by Maimbo (2008) in recent years the foreign currency reserves of many African 
central banks had grown. Sizeable shares of these were managed by external fund managers 
and may have been invested securitised assets originating in the US. 
AFRICA AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: A RISK ASSESSMENT AND ACTION GUIDE 
 
11
Table 1 show the extent of Africa’s exposure towards potential adverse changes in 
external demand. It shows that, in terms of the share of exports in GDI in 2007 (34.5 
per cent), only East Asia and the Pacific and the Middle East and North Africa have 
higher shares. However, the Middle East and North Africa’s high share is a recent phe-
nomenon, driven by increases in fuel prices. 
Considering Figure 1 below, it can be seen that the share of exports in GDP has al-
ways been high in SSA. Indeed, between the period 1977 to 1990, the share of exports 
in GDP was higher in Africa than any other continent or region. It can also be seen from 
Figure 1 that there seems to be a strong relationship between declines in Africa’s export 
share and globally synchronized recessions,11 and between declines in Africa’s export 
share and declines in African growth. 
Figure 1: Exports as percentage of GDP, 1960–2007 
 
(Source. Author’s calculations based on World Development Report Online Data) 
From Figure 1, one can see declines in the export-GDP relationship preceding declines 
in African growth rates. It would seem that the relationship between openness (exports) 
and economic growth had become stronger in Africa since the 1980s – when many coun-
tries started to implement Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which entailed 
trade liberalisation. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 2, which graphs Africa’s ex-
port share and GDP growth rates between 1960 and 2007. 
                                          
11  There were three years, prior to 2009, when 10 or more of the 21 advanced economies were 
simultaneously in recession, namely, 1975, 1980, and 1992 (IMF, 2009a). 
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Figure 2: Export as percentage of GDP and GDP growth in Africa, 1960–2007 
 
(Source of data: World Bank Development Indicators) 
A simple OLS regression of GDP growth on the export share in Africa over the period 
1980 to 2007 finds a statistically highly significant relationship, with the co-efficient of 
the export share equal to 0.55 and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. More-
over, 68 per cent of the variation in African economic growth over this period is ex-
plained by the export-to-GDP share alone. This suggests that Africa is highly reliant on 
export markets, and that declines in export demand will cause declines in economic 
growth. 
There are three12 main reasons to expect that Africa’s exports will decline during the 
current financial and economic crisis:13 
One is due to the decline in export demand from Africa’s major markets in the EU and 
the US. 
The second is due to the decline in commodity prices. Most African countries are ei-
ther dependent on mineral and metals exports, oil exports, and/or agricultural raw ma-
terial exports. The demand for, and the prices of, these commodities have a significant 
impact on export revenues of African countries, and on their subsequent growth. Be-
cause of the concentration of most of Africa’s exports into this relatively narrow range of 
goods, they are highly vulnerable to changes in their prices and in demand, and, as 
such, there have been many calls on African countries to diversify their exports. 
A third reason which may contribute to a decline in Africa’s exports is the greater 
scarcity and cost of trade finance. 
                                          
12  A further reason that will lead to a reduction in the foreign exchange receipts in some African 
countries is the decline in international tourism. However, given that Sub-Saharan Africa has, 
for various reasons, not been a popular tourist destination, the aggregate impact is not likely to 
be hugely significant (see, for example, Naudé and Saayman, 2005). The individual Sub-
Saharan African countries where tourism does play a significant role are Cape Verde, the Gam-
bia, Mauritius and Kenya. Over the longer-term, the tourism potential in Africa is significant 
and would be an important source of economic diversification. 
13  The IMF (2009b) forecast a decline of 8.7 percentage points in Africa’s share of exports in GDP 
in 2009, and a stabilization of the share at around 33 per cent in 2010. 
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Consider, first, the potential decline in export demand. Africa’s traditional export 
markets are the EU and US. In recent years, trade with China, and other “southern en-
gines of growth”, such as Brazil and India, has increased significantly.14 This has led 
some to hope that there has been some measure of “decoupling” of growth rates be-
tween Africa and the OECD countries, and that a decline in demand from the OECD 
would be cushioned by the growing demand for Africa’s exports from China and other 
emerging economies. At issue, here, is the diversity of Africa’s export destinations. 
However, despite the hopes of a “decoupling” due to an increase in trade between Af-
rica and other emerging markets, Africa’s exports are still largely dependent on demand 
from the EU and US. The reason for this is largely historical, but is also due to trade 
preferences from the EU and US (see the Everything but Arms Initiative and the Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act). Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix B show the direction of 
African exports in 1999 and 2007. Although it shows the dramatic increase in the share 
of exports from Africa destined for China, it also indicates that 69 per cent of Africa’s 
exports are still destined for advanced economies (of which 30 per cent still goes to the 
Euro area). 
Growth in African exports are, therefore, still particularly dependent on demand from 
high income countries, in particular, the EU and US, and, by implication, on GDP growth 
in these countries. Figure 3 depicts the close relationship between African export 
growth (as percentage growth in current $ value of exports) and GDP growth in high-
income countries. 
Figure 3: African Export Growth and GDP Growth in High-Income Countries, 
1980-2007 
 
(Source of data: World Bank Development Indicators) 
Figure 3 shows that African export growth has been faster than the growth rates of 
the high-income countries as a group. When high-income growth changes, African ex-
port growth changes in similar directions. However, one change since the 1990s is that 
                                          
14  Between 1999 and 2007, the nominal value (in $) of Africa’s exports to China increased by 
1537 per cent. 
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African export rates have increasingly tended to accelerate faster when there is an up-
turn in high-income country growth. Thus, after the downturn of 2000, high-income 
countries’ growth rate increased by 1.89 per cent between 2001 and 2004; at the same 
time, African exports accelerated from a -3 per cent contraction to over 27 per cent 
growth – 15 times faster. In contrast, when high-income country growth recovered after 
the 1992 recession, African exports accelerated only 8 times faster. 
Figure 3 also shows that export growth in Africa remains sensitive to downturns in 
high-income country growth. Thus, during the downturns of the 1992 global recession, 
the 1998 East Asian crisis and the 2000 dot-com crisis, we find that African export con-
tracted in each case (indeed, much more during the East Asian crisis). If, in a possible 
worst-case scenario, African export growth did, in 2009, indeed contract to 0 per cent, 
then, based upon 2007 export values (in current $), the continent could lose around $ 
63 billion in income. Limiting the loss of exports is therefore vital to minimise the im-
pact. 
A second reason to expect a decline in Africa’s export revenue is due to the decline in 
commodity prices. The global economic crisis has been accompanied by a significant de-
cline in commodity prices, as the demand for fuels, metals and food started to fall off. 
Increases in the prices of commodities, particularly of fuel, metals and agricultural raw 
materials, have been underpinning much of Africa’s good growth since the early 2000s. 
Between January 2003 and July 2008, energy, food and metal price indices rose respec-
tively by 329, 102 and 230 per cent (IMF, 2009a). This not only benefitted countries ex-
porting these goods, but also put pressure on the balance of payments of countries de-
pendent on imported fuel and food. Nevertheless, despite important country differences, 
the overall impact on African growth was tremendously positive, as African countries in 
general (oil exporters as well as oil importers) achieved an 8.1 per cent GDP growth rate 
between 2003 and 2006 (IMF, 2009a). 
But the declines in commodity prices have, perhaps, been even more rapid than their 
rise. Commodity prices generally peaked between March and July 2008, just when initial 
concerns about further fallout from the US sub-prime mortgage crisis were being raised. 
In Figures 4 to 6 the sudden fall in prices of fuel (Figure 4), metals (Figure 5) and 
agricultural raw products (Figure 6) are depicted. 
Figure 4. Petroleum Spot Prices (US $ per barrel), March 2006–March 2009 
 
(Source of data: IMF, 2009a) 
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Figure 4 shows the sudden and sharp decline in the price of oil between July 2008 
and March 2009. Given that almost 40 per cent of Africa’s total exports consist of oil 
(see Table 1) this would come as a severe shock to Africa’s oil exporting countries (but 
would ease the pressure on Africa’s oil importers). 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s current oil exporters are Angola, Chad, the Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and the Sudan. They have also been amongst the fastest grow-
ing economies in Africa in recent years.15 With the exception of Chad and Sudan, they 
have all enjoyed substantial current account surpluses. 
Figure 5. Metal Price Index (2003=100), March 2006–March 2009 
 
(Source of data: IMF, 2009a) 
A number of African economies are important exports of minerals and metals, such as 
the platinum group metals (PGMs), gold, diamonds, copper, chromium, zinc, manga-
nese, nickel, dimension stone and a host of other metallic and non-metallic minerals 
used mainly in manufacturing and construction. In recent years, a substantial proportion 
of the demand for these minerals/metals have been coming from China’s manufacturing 
and construction sectors. 
Figure 5 shows that the average prices of these commodities have declined since 
mid-2008 and March 2009 by more than a 150 per cent. Some of the countries that are 
most likely to be negatively affected by these declines include Botswana (diamonds), the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (diamonds, copper), Mozambique (alumina), South Africa 
(PGMs, gold), and Zambia16 (copper). 
                                          
15  For instance, between 2005 and 2008, the Angolan economy grew on average by 19 per cent 
annually. It is the second largest SSA oil producer after Nigeria, with a capacity of just over 2 
million barrels per day. 
16  Green (2009) documents the impact of the dramatic fall in the price of copper (from $ 9,000 
per ton in July 2008 to $ 2,900 by December 2008) on Zambia, pointing that, as a result, the 
country’s growth forecast for 2009 had been reduced from 6 per cent to 1.6 per cent. 
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Figure 6. Agricultural Raw Commodities Prices Index, March 2006–March 2009 
 
(Source of data: IMF, 2009a) 
Figure 6 shows that agricultural raw commodity prices also declined sharply after 
June 2008. However, in comparison with the steep declines in fuel and metal prices, ag-
ricultural commodity prices have not declined as significantly, with the index depicted in 
Figure 6 declining by about 30 per cent. 
The major agricultural commodities exported by African countries include cotton, cof-
fee, cocoa, grains and cereals, fresh fruit, horticulture (for example, cut flowers), etc. 
Most African countries have been traditionally dependent on the exports of these com-
modities, and agricultural exports remain a significant proportion of total exports from 
African countries. 
Thus, a major source of vulnerability to the trade of African countries is that their ex-
ports tend to be concentrated. This accentuates the impact of declining commodity 
prices. Table 1 showed that, measured by the export concentration index of UNCTAD, 
the degree of concentration in SSA is the highest of all regions. Table C1 and Figure C1 
in Appendix C also show that the export concentration is the highest of all amongst Af-
rica’s oil exporters – they are, consequently, amongst the most vulnerable of African 
countries, given the substantial declines in oil prices. 
A third factor that could contribute to a decline in African exports is a shortage of 
trade credit. The precise magnitude of the trade finance gap in Africa is not yet known, 
although the World Trade Organisation (WTO) increased their estimates of the gap in 
global trade finance from an initial estimate of $25 billion in November 2008 to $100 bil-
lion by March 2009. The fact that many African exporters have been affected by this is 
confirmed by the African Bank, which reports an increase in applications for trade credit 
to its own facilities as well as to those of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). 
Finally, with reference to Table 1, it can be seen that Africa’s trade vulnerability will 
be higher, because: (a) its export concentration is much higher, exposing its trade to 
declines in demand and prices of a few commodities and thus negatively impacting on its 
terms of trade; (b) its foreign indebtedness is on average the highest of all regions; and 
(c) its total reserve levels are the most precarious. Despite the good export growth of 
recent years and improvements in many countries’ balance of payments positions, by 
2006, Africa could still not cover its external debt by foreign reserves, although, in re-
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cent years, progress in debt relief has eased matters slightly. One particular cause of 
vulnerability is that a substantial part of this debt is short-term in nature – Africa needs 
to set aside more than a third of its reserves for short-term debt. 
Foreign exchange reserves and the position of a country’s balance of payments can 
be causes of vulnerability, although, when they are part of a well-managed macro-
economic policy, they can be a source of resilience. In the next section, the resilience of 
African economies in the face of external economic shocks is investigated. 
4 Assessing Africa’s Resilience 
In terms of the approach adopted in this paper (see Diagram 1), Africa’s resilience in 
the face of external shocks depends on macro-economic management, good govern-
ance, ease of doing business, and social cohesion. In this section, it is assessed how 
likely Africa is to cope with its likely exposure to the crisis identified in the previous sec-
tion. 
4.1 Macro-economic management 
Following the IMF (2009a), the resilience of African economies can be considered with 
reference to its current account (Figure 7), fiscal balance (Figure 8) and import cover 
(Figure 9). 
Figures 7, 8 and 9, in particular, show that, in terms of its broad macro-economic 
indicators, African countries, as a whole, have done remarkably well in recent years. In 
aggregate, these would suggest much better macro-economic resilience than the conti-
nent had in 1983 and 1992, when continent-wide growth dipped into the negative fig-
ures. In particular, Africa’s fiscal balances are now overall in surplus, whereas previously 
they were deeply in the red. 
Figure 10 contains a comparison of SSA’s macro-economic balances before the pre-
sent crisis with the situation before the previous crises of 1983 and 1992. It shows that, 
before each of the previous crises, Africa had to cope with the “twin” deficits of both the 
fiscal and the current accounts being in deficit. These constraints meant that African 
countries generally had no leeway in previous economic slumps to use counter-cyclical 
fiscal and monetary policy – indeed, many had to adopt further austerity measures 
(lower spending, higher interest rates). Figure 10 shows that African economies are 
more resilient macro-economically this time, than they were in either of the previous 
downturns. It is particularly noticeable that the African countries’ fiscal balances had 
substantially improved and that Africa has, in total, more than 10 times as much foreign 
reserve cover as during previous crises. 
Figure 7. Current account balance of SSA countries, 1980-2007 (as per cent of 
GDP) 
 
(Source of data: IMF, 2009a) 
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Figure 8. Fiscal balance of SSA countries, 1980-2007 (as per cent of GDP) 
 
(Source of data: IMF, 2009a) 
Figure 9. Forex reserves of SSA countries, 1980-2007 (as days of import cover) 
 
(Source of data: IMF, 2009a) 
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Figure 10. Comparison of SSA macro-economic position to that before previous 
synchronised global recessions (2007 compared to 1982 and 1991) 
 
(Note: Average subsequent growth for 2007 is the average of IMF’s forecasts for 2009 and 2010 growth. 
Source of data: IMF, 2009 and World Bank Development Indicators Online) 
4.2 Good Governance 
The extent of a country or region’s vulnerability to external shocks does not only depend 
on its macro-economic position. A strong macro-economic position is necessary, but not 
a sufficient condition for resilience. Resilience also depends on a government that has 
both the intention and the means to manage its macro-economic position in an appro-
priate manner to minimise the impact of the shocks on human development. Unless for-
eign exchange reserves and fiscal resources are used appropriately, the crisis can still 
wreak havoc in terms of unemployment, poverty and other indicators. 
Most often, a government needs to take unpopular decisions during a recession, and 
be able to withstand popular discontent. Also, more participatory and transparent gov-
ernments may be better able to determine the short-term needs of the population and 
where to target assistance. Therefore, countries with better governance (those which 
are less fragile) may be considered to be more resilient. 
According to Briguglio et al., (2008:10): 
“Without mechanisms of this kind in place, it would be relatively easy for adverse 
shocks to result in economic and social chaos and unrest. Hence, the effects of 
vulnerability would be exacerbated. On the other hand, good governance can 
strengthen an economy’s resilience.” 
The strength of governance can be measured – or more accurately proxied - by a 
country or region’s achievement in terms of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
of the World Bank. The World Bank currently makes available governance indicators for 
212 countries for the period 1996-2007, covering six aspects of governance, namely, 
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voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effec-
tiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.17 
Table 2 contains these global governance indicators for SSA, and compares them, for 
2007, with the OECD, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and East Asia. 
Table 2: Governance Indicators for five regions, 2007 
  
Voice and Ac-
countability 
Political 
Stability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Control of 
Corruption 
East Asia -0.03 0.34 -0.09 -0.18 0.15 -0.19 
Latin 
America 0.12 -0.33 -0.24 -0.15 -0.52 -0.3 
MENA -0.88 -0.51 -0.21 -0.17 -0.04 -0.07 
OECD 1.31 0.96 1.51 1.48 1.51 1.72 
SSA -0.55 -0.53 -0.77 -0.74 -0.75 -0.64 
(Source: compiled from World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators) 
The scores in terms of a governance indicator can range from -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 
(best). The scores contained in Table 2 show that, in terms of all indicators, except for 
voice and accountability, Africa’s governance performance is the worst of all regions. The 
comparison with the OECD is insightful, given that these countries are currently at the 
epicentre of the financial and economic crisis. It suggests that, from the perspective of 
governance, these countries will have greater resilience in buffering the impacts of the 
crisis. 
In terms of short-term management/reaction to the financial and economic crisis, it 
may particularly be government effectiveness and regulatory quality that matters in 
terms of a government’s being able to identify the correct measures for their economies 
to take, and to ensure strong regulation of banks, and financial systems in the imple-
mentation of recovery measures. Voice and accountability is also important, as this can 
act as a force on African governments to channel resources in the right direction in order 
to boost employment and alleviate poverty. 
Political stability is also needed in times of crisis for governments to be able to focus 
on the problem. However, as can be seen from Table 2, political stability in Africa is 
low, and the continent has a history of political instability, in particular, civil strife and 
civil war. The substantial literature scrutinises the causes and consequences of civil war 
in Africa. A strong result in this literature is that the probability of political instability, 
and even the outbreak of civil war, is strongly associated with declines in GDP. Thus, the 
fear has been raised that the current financial and economic crisis, by suddenly and 
sharply reducing African growth rates, may foster instability and conflict. 
Since the eruption of the crisis in October 2008, there has, indeed, been a number of 
cases of the flaring up of political violence in a number of African countries. These in-
clude Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar and Mauritania. 
Despite the improved economic growth and macro-economic position which Africa 
achieved in the recent past, it has not succeeded over time in significantly improving its 
scores in terms of governance indicators. The graphs in Appendix D plot changes in the 
six governance indicators in SSA and other regions between 1996 and 2007, and indi-
cate the persistence in scores. This would strongly imply that lack of good governance 
remains a critical factor which will limit the resilience of African governments in the cur-
rent crisis. 
                                          
17  See http://www.govindicators.org. 
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4.3 The Business Environment 
An important part of the adjustment mechanism in the face of an external shock is a 
country’s private business sector. Rising unemployment and less secure forms of em-
ployment, as is found in the informal sector, imply that entrepreneurship (broadly self-
employment) should be seen as a potential useful coping mechanism. Indeed, promoting 
entrepreneurship and fostering a conducive environment for entrepreneurship is an ex-
plicit part of the European Commission’s recommendations on strengthening Europe’s 
resilience in the face of the current financial and economic crisis. 
The World Bank makes available indicators to measure the “ease of doing business” 
for over 130 countries for the period 2003-2007.18 These contain about 40 “Doing Busi-
ness Indicators”, covering aspects such as the start-up, running and closure of a firm. 
How does Africa fare in terms of the ease of doing business? 
In terms of the overall ranking in the ease of doing business index, African countries 
have the lowest (worst) ranking of all regions, as Figure 11 shows. 
Figure 11: Average Rankings in terms of the Index of the Ease of Doing Busi-
ness, 2007-2008 
 
(Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank’s Doing Business Data) 
The rankings contained in Figure 11 is based upon a number of indicators relating to 
a country or region’s ease of doing business, consisting of: 
• Starting a business; 
• Dealing with construction permits; 
• Employing workers; 
• Registering property; 
• Getting credit; 
• Protecting investors; 
• Paying taxes; 
• Trading across borders; 
• Infrastructure; 
• Enforcing contracts; 
                                          
18  See http://www.doingbusiness.org/. 
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• Closing a business. 
In terms of the resilience to the financial and economic crisis, each one of these is 
generally important, although particular emphasis could be given to starting a business, 
employing workers, getting credit and trading across borders, given the expected conse-
quences of the crisis in terms of reducing employment opportunities, reducing credit and 
reducing trade. 
It is therefore useful to compare SSA with other regions in terms of these three (cost 
of starting a business, ease of employment, availability of credit, and cost of exporting). 
Table 3 compares SSAs aggregate scores on these elements to that of other regions. 
Table 3. Elements of the Ease of Doing Business, Comparing SSA to other Re-
gions, 2007-2008 
  
Cost to export 
(US dollar per 
container) 
Cost to start 
a business 
(% of GNI) 
Difficulty 
of hiring 
index 
Credit 
informa-
tion index 
East Asia & Pacific 902.3 32.3 19.2 2 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 1,649.10 8.6 36.4 4.1 
Latin America & Caribbean 1,229.80 39.1 34.7 3.3 
Middle East & North Africa 1,024.40 41 22.5 2.9 
OECD 1,069.10 4.9 25.7 4.8 
South Asia 1,339.10 31.9 22.2 2.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1,878.80 111.2 39 1.4 
(Source of data: World Bank Doing Business Indicators, http://www.doingbusiness.org/) 
As Table 3 indicates, the environment for doing business is the most difficult in SSA. 
For instance, the cost to export a container is at $1,878 the highest of any region. This 
suggests that the cost competitiveness of African exports is already under pressure. In 
countries in which this is high, resilience to find other markets or to retain some demand 
in the face of a global recession will be low. Similarly, it can be seen that it is relatively 
costly to start a new business firm in Africa. In fact, Table 3 suggests that, in terms of 
the share of GNI, it may be almost three times as expensive to start a new business in 
Africa. Thus, with millions of people expected to lose their jobs in Africa over the next 
year or so, as a result of the global economic crisis (the ILO puts the number of addi-
tional unemployment at 3 million), their options of finding self-employment through 
business creation is likely to be much less, as a result of this high cost. Related to the 
cost of starting a new business is the fact that credit information systems are not as 
well-developed in Africa, so that prospective entrepreneurs may find it additionally hard 
to secure funding. Finally, it can also be seen that it is more difficult to hire people in 
SSA, which implies that, once the global crisis is past and firms start hiring again, the 
take-up rate in SSA may be slower. 
4.4 Social Cohesion 
It has been argued that countries with higher degrees of social cohesion are more resil-
ient (Briguglio et al., 2008). This is because such countries have mechanisms for chan-
nelling conflict about different policy objectives in a constructive manner. Where social 
cohesion is low, the danger is that an adverse external shock may push countries into 
debilitating conflicts, which will make the achievement of consensus around the required 
policies more difficult to achieve. 
In the literature on Africa’s economic development challenges, a substantial amount 
of the literature has dealt with the impact of African countries’ comparatively low levels 
of social cohesion. The most widespread measures of social cohesion (or their lack) have 
been based upon ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (ELF) (see, for instance, Easterly and 
Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2003) and Posner (2004). 
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In this paper the measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation proposed by Posner 
(2004) will be used. His measure is called the “Politically Relevant Ethic Groups” (PREG) 
measure, and is based upon the extent to which different groups engage politically in a 
country. In sub-Section 5.4, the measure and its levels in the different SSA countries 
will be discussed. 
Because this measure is only available for SSA countries, it cannot be used here in a 
comparative fashion. However, a related measure is that provided by the Economist In-
telligence Unit in its “Political Instability Index”, which is compiled using indicators such 
as ethnic fragmentation, the status of minorities, state history, inequality, trust in insti-
tutions, etc., (see Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009:15). This measure is available for a 
larger number of countries, and makes regional comparisons possible. Figure 12 com-
pares Africa with other regions in terms of this measure of social cohesion. 
Figure 12: Political Instability Index for Africa and Other Regions, 2009 
 
(Source: Compiled from data provided in the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009:16; Note that the higher the 
index value, the higher the degree of political instability and the lower the degree of implied social cohesion) 
Figure 12 shows that social cohesion in SSA is, in relative terms, the lowest of all the 
regions, with an average score of 6.47. 
To summarise this section, it is clear that while Africa is not, perhaps, the most vul-
nerable region in the world (although its vulnerability is high), it is the least resilient re-
gion. The implication is that, even if its vulnerability is relatively lower, it may still find 
even such milder shocks more difficult to handle than, for instance, East Asia, which 
may be more exposed. Actions to help Africa through the crisis should, therefore, in par-
ticular also focus on building the short-term resilience of African countries. 
In the next section, the concern will move from the aggregate African level to the 
level of the individual countries. The purpose will be to provide measures of vulnerability 
and resilience for the individual African countries, and identify which countries are most 
at risk from the global economic crisis. 
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5 The Indices of Vulnerability and Resilience for 
Sub-Saharan African Countries 
5.1 Method 
Having described the approach used in this paper to identify the needs and responses to 
the financial and economic crisis for Sub-Sahara Africa in Section 2, and having set out 
the measures of vulnerability and resilience with reference to the aggregate situation of 
SSA in Sections 3 and 4, this section will construct indices of vulnerability and resilience 
for 43 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for which sufficient data is available.19 
This will allow SSA countries to be categorised within a nine-cell matrix depending on 
whether they are low-, medium- or highly-vulnerable, and whether they have low, me-
dium or high resilience. The vulnerability-resilience matrix is depicted in Diagram 2. It 
shows that, based upon the various combinations of vulnerability and resilience, an iden-
tification can be made of countries most at risk, countries at high risk, countries at me-
dium risk, countries at low risk, and countries least at risk. 
Diagram 2. Vulnerability-Resilience Matrix 
 
(Source: Author) 
                                          
19  The countries for which data is insufficient to construct the various indices are Djibouti, Mauri-
tania, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zimbabwe. 
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5.2 Financial and Trade Vulnerability of Sub-Saharan 
African Countries 
As a first step to identify the countries most at risk from the crisis, an index of overall 
financial- and trade-vulnerability was constructed. Following the explanation in Section 
3, this index consists of six components, namely: 
• The share of exports in GDP (%); 
• External debt as a percentage of GDP; 
• Export concentration as measured by UNCTAD’s export concentration index; 
• Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (%); 
• Cross-border liabilities to BIS reporting banks in billion of dollars; 
• Share of credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. 
In each of these components, countries were first ranked from 1 to 43, in which a low 
rank (for example, 1) would indicate low vulnerability, and a high rank (for example, 43) 
would indicate high vulnerability. Then, the average ranking for countries would be ob-
tained, in terms of which countries would be ranked from the lowest average vulnerabil-
ity (1) to the highest degree of average vulnerability (43). Within this ranking, countries 
were divided into roughly three equal groups in order from low to high, and assigned 
into either the low-, medium- or high-vulnerability category. 
In Appendix E, two measures of financial-vulnerability and two measures of trade-
vulnerability are shown for the sample of African countries, as way of illustration. 
Diagram 3 contains the overall financial- and trade-vulnerability ranking for the indi-
vidual African countries. 
Diagram 3. Overall Financial- and Trade-Vulnerability Ranking for African Coun-
tries 
Overall Vulnerability Rank    
Low  Medium  High  
Sierra Leone  1 Chad  15 Burundi  30 
Comoros  2 Guinea-Bissau  16 Mozambique  31 
Uganda  3 Togo  17 Gabon  32 
Rwanda  4 Lesotho  18 South Africa  33 
Central African Republic 5 Tanzania  19 Nigeria  34 
Ethiopia  6 Botswana  20 Angola  35 
Benin  7 Guinea  21 Mali  36 
Equatorial Guinea  8 Burkina Faso  22 Mauritius  37 
Eritrea  9 Kenya  23 Ghana  38 
Madagascar  10 Senegal  24 Cape Verde  39 
Niger  11 Swaziland  25 Côte d'Ivoire 40 
Malawi  12 Namibia  26 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
of  41 
Congo, Rep. of  13 São Tomé and Príncipe  27 Liberia  42 
Gambia, The  14 Cameroon  28 Seychelles, The  43 
    Zambia  29     
(Source: Author’s calculations based upon various sources of data) 
5.3 The Resilience of Sub-Saharan African Countries 
Having identified the vulnerability of the various African countries to the financial and 
economic crisis, the next step is to match these degrees of vulnerability with the de-
grees of resilience of each economy. Thus, while some economies (for example, Mauri-
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tius) may be highly vulnerable, they may also be more, or less, resilient, which will have 
an impact on the extent to which they are at risk from the crisis, and how quickly they 
will recover. 
As explained earlier (see Diagram 2), resilience is determined by: 
• Macro-economic management, which is measured here by: 
• The fiscal resource balance, as percentage of GDP; 
• The external balance, measured as the current account balance percentage 
of GDP; 
• The extent of foreign exchange reserves in terms of months of import cover. 
• The extent of good governance, measured here by: 
• The degree of political stability; 
• The degree of government effectiveness; 
• The extent to which corruption can be controlled. 
• The extent to which the business environment is conducive to new and existing 
business growth, measured here by: 
• The overall ranking of a country on the ease of doing business index; 
• The cost of exporting per container in US $; 
• The cost of starting up a new business in terms of percentage of GNI. 
• Social cohesion, which is measured here by: 
• The degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation; 
• The political instability index. 
As in the case of the overall vulnerability index, the overall resilience index is calcu-
lated as the simple average of each country’s ranking in terms of the above 11 compo-
nents. Countries were ranked in terms of 1–43, from low resilience (rank 1) to high re-
silience (rank 43). Again, countries are divided into three groups based upon their rank-
ing: low, medium and high resilience. 
Appendix F contains as an illustration four of the components of the resilience index. 
Diagram 4 contains the overall resilience ranking for the African countries. 
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Diagram 4. Overall Resilience Ranking for African Countries 
Overall Resilience Rank    
Low  Medium  High  
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  1 Ethiopia  16 Burkina Faso  31 
Chad  3 Sierra Leone  17 Togo  32 
Burundi  4 Zambia  18 Madagascar  33 
Central African Republic 5 Malawi  19 Benin  34 
Eritrea  6 São Tomé and Príncipe  20 Tanzania  35 
Congo, Rep. of  7 Cameroon  21 Mozambique  36 
Guinea-Bissau  8 Mali  22 Lesotho  37 
Côte d'Ivoire 9 Uganda  23 Swaziland  38 
Guinea  10 Nigeria  24 Seychelles, The  39 
Niger  11 Ghana  25 Gabon  40 
Kenya 12 Senegal  26 Namibia  41 
Liberia  13 Cape Verde  27 South Africa  42 
Angola  14 Rwanda  28 Mauritius  43 
Comoros  15 Equatorial Guinea  29 Botswana  44 
    Gambia, The  30     
 (Source: Author’s calculations based on various sources of data) 
5.4 Position in terms of the Vulnerability-Resilience 
Matrix 
The final step in identifying the African countries most at risk from the global economic 
crisis is to compare individual countries’ vulnerability ranking with their resilience rank-
ing. There are nine combinations corresponding to the cells in Diagram 2. Thus for in-
stance countries with low vulnerability and low resilience are at medium risk; as their 
resilience improves, so does their risk decline, to the category of countries with low vul-
nerability and high resilience which are considered to be the least at risk. On the other 
side of the spectrum are countries with high vulnerability and low resilience. These are 
countries most at risk. As highly vulnerable countries’ resilience improve however, the 
measure to which they are at risk decline, so that countries with high resilience and high 
vulnerability may only be at medium risk. Countries with intermediate levels of resilience 
and vulnerability are deemed to be at medium risk. 
Based on these categories and their rankings in terms of the vulnerability and resil-
ience indices constructed in the previous two sub-sections, Diagram 5 categorizes each 
African country in terms of the vulnerability-resilience matrix. 
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Diagram 5: Vulnerability-Resilience Matrix for African Countries at Risk from 
the Global Economic Crisis 
Most at risk  High risk   Medium risk  
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  Mali      Mozambique    
Burundi      Nigeria      Seychelles, The    
Côte d'Ivoire   Ghana      Gabon      
Liberia      Cape Verde    South Africa    
Angola      Mauritania   Mauritius      
Sudan                 
                  
High risk     Medium risk   Low risk     
Chad      Zambia      Burkina Faso    
Guinea-Bissau    São Tomé and Príncipe  Togo      
Guinea      Cameroon    Tanzania      
Zimbabwe   Senegal      Lesotho      
Somalia     Djibouti     Swaziland    
Kenya           Namibia      
            Botswana    
                  
Medium risk  Low risk   Least risk   
Central African Republic Ethiopia      Madagascar    
Eritrea      Sierra Leone    Benin      
Congo, Rep. of    Malawi            
Niger      Uganda            
Comoros      Rwanda            
      Equatorial Guinea          
      Gambia, The          
(Source: Author’s calculations) 
5.5 Comparisons and Assessment 
As shown in Diagram 5, the African countries most at risk are the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Burundi, Côte D’Ivoire, Liberia, Angola and Sudan. 
Also at high risk are Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Kenya, Mali, 
Nigeria, Ghana, Cape Verde and Mauritania. 
Other countries with noted high vulnerability, such as Mauritius, South Africa, Gabon, 
the Seychelles and Mozambique are only at medium risk, due to their better resilience as 
measured here. 
Most (although not all) of the African countries most at risk or at high risk are so-
called “fragile states”. A fragile state can be defined as a state that “cannot provide the 
basic functions of governance to its population” (CIFP,2006:3). The World Bank de-
scribes low-income countries “under stress” (LICUS) as “fragile states”. These are low-
income countries with a score of 3.0 or less in terms of its Country Policy and Institu-
tional Assessment (CPIA) ratings. 
According to the World Bank,the “severe” fragile states of the SSA in 2006 were the 
Central African Republic, Comoros, Liberia, Somalia and Zimbabwe, with the “core” frag-
ile states being Angola, Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte D’Ivoire, 
Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, the Sudan and Togo. Comparing this list to the 
countries most at risk and at high risk from the global economic crisis, it is clear that 
only Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya and Mauritania are non-fragile states in Africa, that is to 
say, at high or most serious risk in Africa. 
This suggests not only that it is mainly Africa’s fragile states, which are most at risk, 
but also that important, large, regional economies, such as Ghana and Kenya, are also 
at risk. 
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As an illustration of the usefulness of correctly defining vulnerability and considering 
resilience, one can compare the countries identified here as being most at risk, with ex-
isting predictions of the impact of the global economic crisis on individual African coun-
tries. Such predictions have been made by the IMF, the World Bank and the African De-
velopment Bank. 
Table 4 below summarises the predictions of the impact of the crisis on GDP growth in 
Africa of the IMF and World Bank. 
Table 4. Predicted Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on GDP growth of Afri-
can Countries, IMF and World Bank (difference between 2009 and 2007) 
Forecasted growth declines, SSA 2007-2009 
Degree of 
decline 
SSA countries according to World 
Bank (November 2008) 
SSA countries according to the 
IMF (April 2009) 
Very high Angola, the Seychelles, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Uganda, South Africa, Botswana, the Gam-
bia 
Equatorial Guinea, Angola, the Seychelles, 
Botswana, Madagascar, South Africa, Cape 
Verde, Ethiopa, Gabon, Namibia, Liberia, 
Lesotho 
High Malawi, Lesotho, Mauritius, Zambia, Cape 
Verde, Swaziland, Sierra Leone, Gabon 
Kenya, DRC, Nigeria, Swaziland, Mozam-
bique, Uganda, the Gambia, Rwanda, 
Zambia, Senegal, Mauritius, Tanzania 
Moderate Rwanda, Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Comoros, Madagascar 
Sierra Leone, Malawi, Ghana, CAR, Camer-
oon, São Tomé, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mali, Niger, Eritrea, Togo, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi 
Positive Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Senegal, Benin, Cen-
tral African Republic, Niger, Burundi, Cam-
eroon, Eritrea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cote 
D’Ivoire, Guinea, DRC, Chad, Zimbabwe, 
Congo 
Comoros, Guinea, Cote d’Ívoire, Chad, 
Congo 
(Source: Author, based upon IMF (2009) and World Bank (2008) forecasts 
From Table 4, it can be seen that the IMF and the World Bank’s forecasts imply that 
some countries would escape a negative impact from the crisis, such as Burundi, Côte 
D’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, which, in the present analysis, have been identified as being 
highly at risk. More in line with the present analysis, the forecasts also implies that Libe-
ria and Angola are highly at risk. South Africa, Botswana, Gabon and Mauritius are also 
identified - by implication - by these institutions as at high risk, although, in the present 
analysis, the resilience of these countries is seen as a factor which may mitigate the im-
pact. 
A further comparison is with the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2009b), which 
classified African countries as being more or less vulnerable (bearing in mind the earlier 
criticism that the AfDB measurement of vulnerability refers more to outcomes in terms 
of resilience). This is done in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Countries at Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 
Degree of being at 
Risk 
SSA Countries according 
to the present frame-
work 
Degree of 
Vulnerability 
SSA Countries according 
to the African Develop-
ment Bank* 
Countries most at risk Burundi, Congo (DR), Côte 
D’Ivoire, Liberia, Angola, the 
Sudan, Zimbabwe 
Very high Burundi, Eritrea, Madagascar, 
Niger, Senegal, the Sudan, 
Togo 
Countries at high risk Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Zim-
babwe, Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, 
Ghana, Cape Verde, Maurita-
nia, Kenya. 
High Angola, Central African Repub-
lic, Congo (DR), Côte D’Ivoire, 
the Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, São Tomé & Principe, 
Sierra Leone, Zambia 
Countries at medium 
risk 
Central African Republic, Eri-
trea, Congo, Niger, Comoros, 
Zambia, São Tomé and Prin-
cipe, Cameroon, Senegal, Mo-
zambique, the Seychelles, Ga-
bon, South Africa, Mauritius  
Moderate Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Chad, Djibouti, Ethio-
pia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, the Sey-
chelles, Tanzania, Zimbabwe 
Countries at low risk Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Malawi, 
Uganda, Rwanda, Equatorial 
Guinea, the Gambia, Burkina-
Faso, Togo, Tanzania, Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Namibia, Botswana 
Low Uganda, Cameroon, 
Swaziland, Equatorial Guinea 
Countries at least risk Madagascar, Benin Very low Botswana, Gabon, Namibia 
Note: *The AfDB does not classify South Africa. 
Here, one can again see some similarities in that some of Africa’s fragile states top 
the lists in terms of being “highly vulnerable” or at high risk, such as Burundi, Angola, 
Liberia, the Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. But there are also important 
differences, such as the very low vulnerability which the AfDB affords to Botswana and 
Gabon, and that it only sees Cape Verde, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mauritius, the Seychelles 
and Zimbabwe as “moderately vulnerable”. 
6 Responding to the Crisis: Mitigation, Coping 
and Risk Reduction 
From the analysis in this paper the following conclusions can be made regarding the way 
forward for SSA countries. 
• First, SSA is the world’s developing region most at risk. 
• Second, not all countries will be equally at risk. Those most at risk include most 
of Africa’s fragile states, as well as a few larger regional economies. 
• Third, SSA countries are generally more resilient in terms of macro-economic 
management now, than in previous globally-synchronized recessions. 
• Fourth, globally co-ordinated responses, regional responses and country efforts 
to extricate SSA from the crisis will need to focus on: (a) mitigation; (b) cop-
ing; and (c) risk reduction. Here, (a) and (b) are short- and medium-term ac-
tions, and (c) more long-term strategy. 
• Five, the duration of this crisis is a vital, but currently unknown, variable which 
will affect the extent to which SSA is at risk. A recovery in the advanced 
economies sooner, rather than later, is an imperative. It is therefore important 
for SSA development and growth that measures towards stimulating Western 
economies and re-establishing confidence in Western-based banks are success-
ful. 
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• Six, at the heart of the crisis for SSA countries is the loss in export markets 
and the resulting reduction in foreign exchange receipts. Over the short-term, 
crisis mitigation should prioritize actions to address the deterioration of SSA 
trade and foreign currency inflows. 
• Seven, the major fear is that the crisis, even if short-term, will leave long-term 
scars on African society through impacting on poverty and causing adverse 
conditions for coping. There is, therefore, urgency in extending social safety 
frameworks throughout SSA, and mobilising governmental, regional and donor 
financial support for this. The fast-tracking of aid disbursements will be vital. 
• Eight, it is clear from the nature of the current crisis that SSA is at risk, and will 
remain at risk from future perturbations in the global economy, due to weak-
nesses in the global financial architecture. 
The main recommendations for mitigation, coping and risk-reduction are summarised 
in Table 6. A detailed unpacking of each of these action plans and strategies falls out-
side the scope of this study. However, in future weeks and months, during and after the 
UN “Conference at the Highest Level on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its 
Impact on Development” (New York, 1-3 June 2009), effort should focus on the appro-
priate actions to be taken in this regard in each country, according to its own specific 
challenges in terms of vulnerability and resilience. 
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7 Concluding Remarks 
The socio-economic challenges facing Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is well-known. Below 
the headlines of conflict, corruption, disasters and disease, the statistics point to a re-
gion struggling to attain and maintain adequate living standards for its people. It is the 
world’s poorest continent. 
There is no single cause of Africa’s woes. Many explanations have been forwarded 
(see, for example, Ndulu et al., 2007a). These have been concerned with both long-
term1 and shorter-term determinants.2 Common to these is the idea of a low-income 
“poverty trap” in which low investment, low productivity and low growth are perpetuated 
by various factors.3 Given the centrality of inadequate investment, productivity and 
growth, the SSA post-independence record shows that there was initially good invest-
ment and growth, but that growth declined during the 1980s.4 
Thus, between 1961 and 1975, SSA experienced average annual GDP growth of 4.5 
per cent, which declined to 2.1 per cent over the next ten years – the lowest of any re-
gion and lower than population growth rates. Following the end of the Cold War, the 
mid- to late-1990s saw something of a consolidation in many African economies with 
progress in terms of economic and political reforms. Average annual GDP growth be-
tween 1995 and 1999 was up to 3.4 per cent.5 At the start of the Twenty-first century, 
many African countries were - after two or more decades - beginning to register more 
respectable growth rates. Supported by a buoyant world economy and favourable prices 
for its commodities,6 continent-wide economic growth rates between 2003 and 2006 ac-
celerated to an average of 8.1 per cent – after East Asia and the Pacific the highest of 
any region. Optimism that Africa was finally starting to recover was catching on. 
Then cracks started to appear in the world economy. Optimism in the sustainability of 
African growth was seriously dented – first, by the peak in fuel prices in July 2008, 
which was especially bad news for fuel importers, and then, in September 2008, by the 
                                          
1  Bolt and Bezemer (2009) summarises four main “long-run/term” explanations for African de-
velopment. These are “extractive colonial institutions” including the slave trade, the impact of 
different colonial legal frameworks, the impact on human capital during the colonial era, and 
geography. In addition to these, the degree of pre-colonial centralisation has also been noted 
to have influenced long-term development patterns (see Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007). The rela-
tive importance of “colonial” (institutional) versus geography explanations in the literature has 
been described as “a competition between geography and institutions” (Warner, 2002: 1). See, 
also, Naudé (2004) and Naudé and Krugell (2007). 
2  Over the shorter-term (i.e., essential post-independence) Ndulu et al., (2007b) explains Af-
rica’s challenges being due to a combination of four policy “syndromes”: state controls, adverse 
redistribution, intertemporally unsustainable spending, and state breakdown (see, also, Fosu, 
2007 for a discussion). 
3  Collier (2006a) discusses four factors keeping Africa in a low-income poverty trap, such as con-
flict, the corruption trap, the dependence on primary commodities, and a fractionalised society. 
Birdsall (2007) describes inadequate institutions (an institutional trap) as a factor. 
4  According to Collier and O’Connell (2007), African GDP per capita diverged from the rest of the 
world at an average annual rate of 5 per cent between 1980 and 2000. 
5  An important feature of SSA’s growth is its high volatility. According to Fosu (2007:2) SSA’s 
standard deviation of GDP is the highest of all regions. Arbache and Page (2007; 2008) points 
out that this reflects that African economies have experienced both growth accelerations as 
well as growth decelerations (including “growth collapses”) over this period. 
6  Between January 2003 and July 2008 energy, food and metal price indices rose respectively by 
329, 102 and 230 per cent (IMF, 2009). It is important to note that there is significant differ-
ence in economic performance between Africa’s oil exporters (for example, Angola, Nigeria, 
Equatorial Guinea) and oil importers. For instance, between 2003 and 2006, oil exporters eco-
nomic growth averaged 10.1 per cent compared to the growth of oil imports of 6.8 per cent. 
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bursting of the “greatest credit bubble in history”7 - the financial crisis which originated 
in the US. 
In early December 2008, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) con-
firmed that the US economy was in recession, and, a week later, estimates were re-
leased showing that the UK economy was also contracting. Soon, it became clear that 
other Member States of the EU, such as France, Germany, Ireland and Sweden, amongst 
others, and other major markets, such as Japan and Singapore, were also in recession. 
Initially, many had hoped that African countries might be spared the fallout from the 
crisis based on three beliefs: 
• First, that the crisis had its origin in the US’s financial sector, while African 
banks had limited exposure to US-originated securities; 
• Second, that the initial expansionary fiscal and monetary policies implemented 
by the US and European governments would sufficiently stimulate their econo-
mies to prevent a slump in demand and a decline in aid to Africa; and 
• Three, that there might have been some de-coupling of the dependency of Afri-
can growth rates on US and European growth rates, given the expansion of 
trade between Africa and Asia in recent years. 
By the end of the first quarter of 2009, there was growing awareness that these 
hopes might have been too optimistic. For one, as discussed in this paper, it started to 
appear that Africa’s financial markets would not escape unharmed. The effect of the cri-
sis on Africa’s financial markets is more subtle, and perhaps more long-term, as has 
been argued here, although short-term vigilance (and willingness and ability to act) on 
the part of the SSA’s banking sector is still required. 
Also, despite the US, the states of the EU and other countries having adopted finan-
cial sector bailout programmes and fiscal and monetary stimulus packages as early as 
November 2008, by the end of the first quarter of 2009, their economies had failed to 
respond. For instance, between October and December 2008 approximately $ 2 trillion 
was allocated towards financial sector bailouts (for example, in the form of bank recapi-
talisations and guarantees), approximately $ 800 billion for fiscal expansion (in the UK, 
the EU and also China and India) and interest rates were cut significantly by the Euro-
pean Central Bank, the Federal Reserve Bank, the Bank of England, and central banks in 
Canada, China, Denmark, Japan, Sweden and South Korea - in many cases, to their 
lowest level in 50 years. In spite of these cuts, growth prospects continued to worsen,8 
and, along with it, the demand for exports from countries such as Africa, to such an ex-
tent that IMF forecasts published in April 2009 predicted a fall in global trade during 
2009 of 11 per cent – a significant downward revision from their October 2008 estimate 
of a decline of 2.8 per cent. Simultaneously, the worldwide gap in trade finance had 
grown from an initial estimate of $ 25 billion in November 2008 to $ 100 billion by March 
2009. The eventual success of these measures, and the reversal in the contraction of 
world trade, are ultimately going to determine just how much SSA is at risk, and how far 
the development progress of recent years will be thrown back. In the meantime, SSA 
must cope by preventing households from sliding into poverty and engaging in coping 
with adversity through their own fiscal and monetary stimulus packages, where the 
scope exists. 
At the same time that bailout and stimulus plans have failed to stem the decline in 
world trade and trade finance, fears started to grow that foreign aid (Official Develop-
                                          
7  See Morris (2008), who discusses the origins of the financial crisis and who notes that: “It is 
impossible to exaggerate the sheer idiocy of the financial machinery of the 2000s.” (p.xvii). 
8  According to Taylor (2009), the pumping in of liquidity into global markets is based on a misdi-
agnosis and that the crisis is one of counterparty risk rather than a shortage of liquidity. As 
such, he argues that “government actions and interventions caused, prolonged and worsened 
the financial crisis” (p.27). 
AFRICA AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: A RISK ASSESSMENT AND ACTION GUIDE 
 
36
ment Assistance – ODA) to African countries might decline. The US President suggested 
in March 2009 that his administration might not achieve its target of doubling foreign 
aid.9 Other countries such as Ireland, Italy and Latvia decreased their aid budgets,10 and 
the value of aid from the UK has been substantially reduced – by up to $ 41 billion over 
the next seven years - due to the shrinking of the UK economy and the depreciation of 
the British Pound. Given that aid has always tended to decline in the past during reces-
sions, it may, therefore, not be unreasonable to expect further declines – even if this 
runs contrary to the commitments made by advanced countries at the International 
Conference on Financing for Development in Doha in December 2008. Maintaining aid 
commitments, and accelerating these is, however, vital especially to enable the SSAs 
fragile states to cope with the current crisis. 
Third, hopes that African countries might avoid the worst of the financial and eco-
nomic crisis in the West due to de-coupling of growth rates have also turned out to be 
overly optimistic. African growth rates and expected future growth rates came tumbling 
down with amazing speed after the crisis erupted in September 2008. And where there 
was some hope that Africa’s stronger trade and investment ties with China and India 
might have provided some protection, these were dashed as it became clear that these 
economies would also be negatively affected by the crisis. Both China and India’s growth 
performance decelerated to the extent that both adopted fiscal stimulus packages by the 
end of 2008. Moreover, by January 2009, it had become clear that China’s year-on-year 
exports had declined by 18 per cent in value. As the demand for China’s products de-
cline (its major export markets are the US and EU), so does its demand for African ex-
ports. The need for SSA to restructure its exports (over the long-term) is vital for SSA to 
reduce its vulnerability to external shocks. At the same time, reform of the international 
financial architecture is needed to ensure adequate and just international insurance 
mechanisms in times of short-term crises. 
Much has been written elsewhere about the reform of the international financial archi-
tecture. For present purposes, though, it should be noted that there is a responsibility 
on the G-20 countries to ensure that the process and prospects for such reform is not 
undermined by short-term actions to pull their own economies out of recession. Con-
sider, for instance, that the most recent G-20 meeting, on 2 April 2009 in London, did 
not seriously set in motion the reform of the IMF and the World Bank, and failed to ad-
dress the issue of the dollar (and related global imbalances in trade). 
Indeed, at the G-20 summit, the main thrust was on short-term measures, including 
bank bail-outs, to stabilise the US and European battered banking systems. These 
measures are not popular, neither in the US nor in developing countries. As Kofi Annan 
recently wrote in this regard: 
“‘…the very way in which the developed world has responded to the crisis contin-
ues to worsen their situation by encouraging capital to flee to perceived safety.” 
This has also been referred to as “financial protectionism”, whereby the US, as issuer 
of the world’s reserve currency, can pump sufficient money into its banking sector to 
guarantee its stability, thereby attracting funds from other countries without this ability. 
Damaging developing countries’ access to capital, this comes at the expense of US tax-
payers. As Joseph Stiglitz recently wrote in the New York Times: 
“What the Obama administration is doing is far worse than nationalisation: it is er-
satz capitalism, the privatising of gains and the socialising of losses. It is a ‘part-
                                          
9  See “Foreign Aid Suffers as Financial Crisis Persists” at:  
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/washington/news.aspx?id=125801 
10  Ireland reduced its aid budget by 10 per cent (€95 million), Italy by 65 per cent and Latvia by 
100 per cent (see “Less and Worse Aid” at: 
http://www.eurodad.org/whatsnew/articles.aspx?id=3285). 
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nership’ in which one partner robs the other. And such partnerships — with the 
private sector in control — have perverse incentives, worse even than the ones 
that got us into the mess.” 
It may be no surprise that a recent survey in the US found that 51 per cent of Ameri-
cans want to see an end to bailout money for banks. 
Only about $ 50 billion of the G-20’s commitments has been directly allocated for the 
“poorest” developing countries. While substantial (it is about half of Africa’s estimated 
output loss in 2009), it may paradoxically come to be seen in time as to have been in-
adequate and inequitable. Many have already remarked on the fact that huge amounts 
of money have been found at short notice to bail out banks, but that money to bail out 
the world’s bottom billion is always in short supply. 
The current global economic crisis, and the way it has been handled over the short-
term by the advanced countries, and, due to its fundamental origin in global imbalances, 
may very well contribute towards a paradigm shift in global development. Many, there-
fore, see the current crisis as the opportunity to take such change forward. 
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9 Appendices 
9.1 Appendix A: Growth Forecasts for Africa and the 
World Economy for 2009 
Figure A1. IMF Growth Forecasts for Africa and the World Economy for 2009, % 
change 
 
(Source: Author’s compilation based on IMF World Economic Outlook Projections) 
Figure A2. World Bank Growth Forecasts for Africa and the World Economy for 
2009, % change 
 
(Source: Author’s compilation based on World Bank Global Economic Prospects 2009 Projections) 
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9.2 Appendix B: Direction of Africa’s Exports, 1999 and 
2007 (%) 
Figure B1: Direction of Africa’s Exports in 1999 (%) 
 
(Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Data) 
Figure B2: Direction of Africa’s exports in 2007 (%) 
 
(Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Data) 
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9.3 Appendix C: Export Concentration in Africa compared 
to other Regions, 2006 
Table C1. Number of Export Products and Export Concentration Index of Africa 
in Comparison, 2006 
Region Number of export products Export concentration index* 
Developing economies 260 0.14 
Developed economies 260 0.06 
Latin America 256 0.15 
Southern Asia (excl. India) 249 0.48 
Eastern, Southern and South-
Eastern Asia 260 0.11 
Northern Africa 244 0.46 
Sub-Saharan Africa 259 0.40 
Major petroleum exporters: 
Africa 221 0.76 
(Source: compiled from UNCTAD's export concentration index, where 1 is maximum concentration) 
Figure C1. Export Concentration Index, Comparing Africa with other Regions, 
2006 
 
(Source: compiled from UNCTAD's export concentration index, where 1 is maximum concentration) 
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9.4 Appendix D: Governance indicators in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and other regions, 1996-2007 
Figure D1: Voice and Accountability 
 
(Source: Based on data from World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators) 
Figure D2. Political Stability 
 
(Source: Based on data from World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators) 
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Figure D3.Government Effectiveness 
 
(Source: Based on data from World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators) 
Figure D4. Regulatory Quality 
 
(Source: Based on data from World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators) 
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Figure D5. Rule of Law 
 
(Source: Based on data from World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators) 
Figure D6. Control of Corruption 
 
(Source: Based on data from World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators) 
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9.5 Appendix E: Vulnerability Index Components for 
Individual African Countries 
Figure E1: Export share in GDP (%) 
 
(Source of data: IMF, 2009a) 
Figure E2. External debt as percentage of GDP 
 
(Source of data: IMF, 2009a) 
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Figure E3. Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets (%) 
 
(Source of data: IMF, 2009c) 
Figure E4. Cross-border Liabilities to BIS reporting Banks, $ billion 
 
(Source of data: IMF, 2009c) 
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9.6 Appendix F: Resilience Index Components for 
Individual African Countries 
Figure F1. Fiscal Balances as percentage of GDP 
 
(Source of data: IMF, 2009) 
Figure F2. Current account balances as percentage of GDP 
 
(Source of data: IMF, 2009) 
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Figure F3. Government effectiveness indicator 
 
(Source of data. Global Governance Indicators, World Bank) 
Figure F4.  Lack of Social Cohesion as Measured by the Ethnolinguistic Frac-
tionalisation Index 
 
(Source of data: Posner, 2004) 
  
Table 6. Generic Responses to the Global Economic Crisis for Sub-Saharan African Countries 
Mitigation Actions 
Objectives Actions Comments 
Restore financial confidence Monitoring, supervision and regulation of financial institutions 
Recapitalisation of banks where needed 
Important in banking-exposed countries 
Expand trade Avoid protectionism 
Maintain competitive exchange rate policies 
Obtain balance of payments support 
Obtain trade finance support 
Aid for trade 
Both measures to support supply response 
as well as demand needed. 
Particularly challenging for oil exporters 
Expand finance  Increase aid 
Accelerate aid disbursement 
Attract FDI 
Facilitate remittances 
Stop and return illicit funds/flight capital 
Attract finance for investment in infrastructure projects 
Front-loading of aid 
Faster disbursement of allocations 
Maintain commitments to aid 
More aggressive marketing of opportunities 
in SSA needed 
Coping Actions 
Objectives Actions Comments 
Expand domestic demand Undertake public works programmes 
Prevent unemployment escalating 
Provide social security, for example, Cash transfers, school feeding programmes 
Consider tax reductions 
Where fiscal space permit 
Expand domestic resource mobilisation 
Absorb financial losses Draw down reserves 
Utilize short-term international financial assistance 
Where reserves permit 
Accelerate IMF disbursements 
Expand self-employment Relax business regulations Support small business and informal sector 
activities – note the role of women herein 
Technical assistance Obtain assistance in planning and co-ordinating responses 
Ensure the targeting and distribution of assistance 
Provision of information and monitoring of the impact 
Monitoring, impact analysis and evaluation 
of data 
Geographic information systems and use of 
technology to ensure targeting assistance 
Peacekeeping Monitor violent conflict 
Address grievances 
Contain violence and spillovers 
Plan for displacements and migrations 
Strengthen role and oversight functions of 
AU, UN 
Risk Reduction Strategies 
Export and production di-
versification  
Expand South-South Trade 
Promotion of manufacturing (for example, through agro-industries) 
Promotion of tourism 
Regional integration, development partner-
ships and investment in infrastructure are 
basic requirements. 
Environmental and energy needs offer chal-
  
Infrastructure investment, especially in transport and business infrastructure lenges and opportunities. 
Banking system strengthen 
and financial deepening 
Expand access to finance 
Encourage financial innovation 
Maintain adequate bank capital requirements 
Encourage domestic banking expansion 
 
Social cohesion End conflicts/promote peace 
Participatory and inclusive governance 
Protection of minorities 
Nation-building 
 
Good governance and 
institutional development 
Build strong and effective government 
Strengthen basic institutions 
- Property rights, - Rule of law , - Contract enforcement, - independent judiciary 
 
Reform of international fi-
nancial architecture 
Give greater voice to SSA 
Advance the Doha Round, with more development content 
Reform Bretton Woods 
More development role for G20 
Reform aid architecture – volumes and effectiveness 
Address global imbalances  
 
(Source: Compiled by the Author) 
 
 
